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This feature is only available on Chainloop’s platform paid plans.
Chainloop provides a set of built-in policies and policy groups that can be used to enforce compliance and security requirements in your software supply chain.

Policies

activex-controls-fuzzed

Verify that Windows ActiveX/COM controls were fuzz-tested with the CERT/CC Dranzer tool and that no control failed, hung, or crashed during the run. Any failed or hung object, or any crash finding (access violation, Win32 exception, or error), is a candidate for !Exploitable triage and must be remediated prior to Product release.
  • Categories: security compliance
  • Supported material types: CERTCC_DRANZER

ai-agent-present

Checks for AI agent presence via configuration materials in the attestation or known bot reviewers on the PR
  • Categories: ai
  • Supported material types: ATTESTATION CHAINLOOP_PR_INFO

ai-config-ai-agents-allowed

Verifies that the AI agent in the configuration is in the allowed list
  • Categories: ai
  • Supported material types: CHAINLOOP_AI_AGENT_CONFIG CHAINLOOP_AI_CODING_SESSION
Inputs

ai-config-mcp-servers-allowed

Verifies that all MCP servers configured in an AI agent configuration or invoked during an AI coding session are in the allowed list
  • Categories: ai
  • Supported material types: CHAINLOOP_AI_AGENT_CONFIG CHAINLOOP_AI_CODING_SESSION
Inputs

ai-config-no-dangerous-commands

Detects dangerous or destructive shell commands in AI coding session transcripts (assistant Bash tool calls) and AI agent configuration files (instructions, skills, subagents, MCP config)
  • Categories: ai
  • Supported material types: CHAINLOOP_AI_AGENT_CONFIG CHAINLOOP_AI_CODING_SESSION
Inputs

ai-config-no-secrets

Verifies that AI agent configuration files (instructions, skills, MCP config) and AI coding session transcripts do not contain hardcoded secrets such as API keys, tokens, passwords, or credentials
  • Categories: ai
  • Supported material types: CHAINLOOP_AI_AGENT_CONFIG CHAINLOOP_AI_CODING_SESSION
Inputs

ai-instructions-architecture-with-paths

Verifies that AI agent instruction files describe the project architecture by referencing at least one directory path and naming an architectural pattern
  • Categories: ai
  • Supported material types: CHAINLOOP_AI_AGENT_CONFIG
Inputs

ai-instructions-code-style-specificity

Verifies that AI agent instruction files contain at least one concrete, project-specific code style rule referencing a specific linter, formatter, or language pattern
  • Categories: ai
  • Supported material types: CHAINLOOP_AI_AGENT_CONFIG
Inputs

ai-instructions-commands-documented

Verifies that AI agent instruction files specify exact, executable commands for each required action rather than vague instructions
  • Categories: ai
  • Supported material types: CHAINLOOP_AI_AGENT_CONFIG
Inputs

ai-instructions-doc-guidance

Verifies that AI agent instruction files reference documentation practices — where docs live, what format to use, and how to keep READMEs and inline comments relevant
  • Categories: ai
  • Supported material types: CHAINLOOP_AI_AGENT_CONFIG
Inputs

ai-instructions-explicit-boundaries

Verifies that AI agent instruction files define explicit behavioral boundaries — concrete paths or actions the agent must not access or perform
  • Categories: ai
  • Supported material types: CHAINLOOP_AI_AGENT_CONFIG
Inputs

ai-instructions-git-workflow-documented

Verifies that AI agent instruction files document at least two git workflow conventions — branch naming, commit message format, or PR requirements
  • Categories: ai
  • Supported material types: CHAINLOOP_AI_AGENT_CONFIG
Inputs

ai-instructions-gotchas

Verifies that AI agent instruction files document at least two project-specific gotchas — non-obvious behaviors, edge cases, or pitfalls the agent would get wrong without explicit guidance
  • Categories: ai
  • Supported material types: CHAINLOOP_AI_AGENT_CONFIG
Inputs

ai-instructions-size-bounds

Checks that each instruction/skill file in an AI agent configuration has a line count within configurable bounds (instructions default max 200, skills default max 500)
  • Categories: ai
  • Supported material types: CHAINLOOP_AI_AGENT_CONFIG
  • Auto-match: Yes
Inputs

ai-instructions-verification-criteria

Verifies that AI agent instruction files include verification mechanisms such as unit tests, executable test commands, or expected input/output examples
  • Categories: ai
  • Supported material types: CHAINLOOP_AI_AGENT_CONFIG
Inputs

ai-skills-descriptions-actionable

Verifies that each AI agent skill describes what it does, when to use it, and what problems it solves
  • Categories: ai
  • Supported material types: CHAINLOOP_AI_AGENT_CONFIG
Inputs

ai-subagents-descriptions-actionable

Verifies that each AI agent subagent has a description specifying trigger, scope, and purpose, and that system prompts are substantive
  • Categories: ai
  • Supported material types: CHAINLOOP_AI_AGENT_CONFIG
Inputs

ai-subagents-permissions-scope

Verifies that no subagent sets permissionMode to bypassPermissions or declares MCP servers absent from parent configuration
  • Categories: ai
  • Supported material types: CHAINLOOP_AI_AGENT_CONFIG

api-security

Check API security posture findings for weaknesses above a severity threshold. Supported Tools:
  • Salt Security (SARIF, API posture gaps)
  • Categories: security API
  • Supported material types: SARIF
Inputs

api-security-scan-present

Checks that an API security scan material is present in the attestation. Supports Salt Security SARIF reports.
  • Categories: security API
  • Supported material types: ATTESTATION

artifact-signed

Checks that the provided piece of evidence has a signature
  • Categories: security signing
  • Supported material types: CONTAINER_IMAGE HELM_CHART

artifact-tag-not-latest

Checks that the provided OCI artifact hasn’t been tagged with the latest tag.
  • Categories: security
  • Supported material types: CONTAINER_IMAGE

binary-compiler-hardening

Checks BinSkim compiler-hardening results (ASLR, secure tools, critical warnings, …) for every analyzed binary. A binary BinSkim could not evaluate because its PDB (debug symbols) could not be loaded (E_PDB_NOT_FOUND) always fails: its hardening configuration cannot be verified without symbols. For binaries that were analyzed, the policy raises a violation for each hardening rule finding that matches the configured rules and meets the severity threshold. Supports BinSkim SARIF format.
  • Categories: security binaries
  • Supported material types: SARIF
Inputs

binary-scan

Checks binary scan reports for security and correctness errors, including BinSkim tool notifications (e.g. PDB-load failures that prevent a binary from being analyzed). Supports BinSkim SARIF format.
  • Categories: security binaries
  • Supported material types: SARIF
Inputs

binary-symbols-stripped

Verifies that release binaries in a BinSkim SARIF report are stripped of debug symbols. BinSkim reports a binary it could not analyze because its PDB (debug symbols) could not be loaded as an ERR997.ExceptionLoadingPdb / E_PDB_NOT_FOUND tool notification. This policy treats that as the desired state: a stripped release binary. Conversely, any binary BinSkim was able to analyze (its PDB loaded, so debug symbols are present) raises a violation. Each scanned binary is evaluated individually. The set of scanned binaries is taken from the report’s artifacts list when present, falling back to the binaries referenced by analysis results.
  • Categories: security binaries
  • Supported material types: SARIF
Inputs

branch-deletion-blocked

Ensures that branch deletion is blocked to protect important branches from accidental deletion. Supports both GitHub and GitLab.
  • Categories: security
  • Supported material types: CHAINLOOP_RUNNER_CONTEXT
Inputs

branch-force-push-blocked

Ensures that force pushes are blocked on branches to prevent bypassing code review and history integrity. Supports both GitHub and GitLab.
  • Categories: security
  • Supported material types: CHAINLOOP_RUNNER_CONTEXT
Inputs

branch-linear-history-required

Ensures that branches require linear history to prevent merge commits and maintain a clean commit history.
  • Categories: security
  • Supported material types: CHAINLOOP_RUNNER_CONTEXT
Inputs

check-compliance-requirement

Checks that the project passes the compliance requirement
  • Categories: compliance
  • Supported material types: ATTESTATION
Inputs

ci-pipeline-security

Checks CI/CD pipeline configuration security scan results for findings. Supported Tools:
  • zizmor (SARIF) — GitHub Actions workflow security auditor
  • Categories: security CI/CD
  • Supported material types: SARIF
Inputs

ci-user-strongly-authenticated

Ensures that CI users have strong authentication enabled, including two-factor authentication and verified accounts. Only applies to GitHub provider.
  • Categories: security
  • Supported material types: CHAINLOOP_RUNNER_CONTEXT

code-coverage

Checks a code coverage report against a given percentage threshold. It uses JaCoCo counters as in JaCoCo Documentation
  • Categories: coverage SAST
  • Supported material types: JACOCO_XML
  • Auto-match: Yes
Inputs

commits-signed-required

Ensures that all commits are signed to verify their authenticity and integrity.
  • Categories: security
  • Supported material types: CHAINLOOP_RUNNER_CONTEXT
Inputs

containers-with-sbom

Ensures all OCI container images have an associated SBOM material. Only the CycloneDX SBOM format is supported. SBOMs generated by Syft using the ‘latest’ tag are not recognized and will result in a policy violation.
  • Categories: sbom container
  • Supported material types: ATTESTATION
Inputs

cves-in-kev

Checks a CVE report against CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities KEV Catalog. Supports Trivy’s SARIF, Blackduck, GHAS Dependency Scans and CycloneDX SBOM outputs.
  • Categories: security CVE
  • Supported material types: BLACKDUCK_SCA_JSON GHAS_DEPENDENCY_SCAN SARIF SBOM_CYCLONEDX_JSON

cwe-top25

Checks for CWEs in the 2025 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses list. See the CWE Top 25 for the complete list. Supported Tools:
  • SARIF: KICS, SpotBugs, ZAP, StackHawk, Polaris, Semgrep, Opengrep, SonarQube, CodeQL and Salt Security
  • GitLab Security Reports: Native GitLab, SonarQube
  • Other: CSAF Security Advisory, BlackDuck SCA, GitHub Advanced Security Dependency Scan
  • Categories: security CWE
  • Supported material types: BLACKDUCK_SCA_JSON CSAF_SECURITY_ADVISORY GHAS_DEPENDENCY_SCAN GITLAB_SECURITY_REPORT SARIF

cwe-top26-40-cusp

Checks a vulnerability report for CWEs in the 2026 CWE On the Cusp list (CWEs ranked 26-40). See the CWE On the Cusp for the complete list. Supported Tools:
  • SARIF: KICS, SpotBugs, ZAP, StackHawk, Polaris, Semgrep, Opengrep, SonarQube, CodeQL and Salt Security
  • GitLab Security Reports: Native GitLab, SonarQube
  • Other: BlackDuck SCA, GitHub Advanced Security Dependency Scan
  • Categories: security CWE
  • Supported material types: BLACKDUCK_SCA_JSON GHAS_DEPENDENCY_SCAN GITLAB_SECURITY_REPORT SARIF

evidence-prompt

Analyzes evidence using an AI-powered prompt. Leverages any OpenAI or Anthropic API integration you have set up in your organization to perform prompt-based analysis of materials (e.g., SBOMs).
  • Categories: security compliance
  • Supported material types: ATTESTATION BLACKDUCK_SCA_JSON CHAINLOOP_PR_INFO CHAINLOOP_RUNNER_CONTEXT CONTAINER_IMAGE CSAF_SECURITY_ADVISORY EVIDENCE GHAS_DEPENDENCY_SCAN GHAS_SECRET_SCAN GITLAB_SECURITY_REPORT GITLEAKS_JSON HELM_CHART JACOCO_XML SARIF SBOM_CYCLONEDX_JSON SBOM_SPDX_JSON TWISTCLI_SCAN_JSON
Inputs

iac-misconfiguration

Checks for misconfigurations in IAC (infrastructure as code) sources. Supports SARIF from Checkov and WizCLI. Both tools map their native severity to the standard SARIF result.level field:
  • error: Checkov errors, WizCLI high/critical findings
  • warning: Checkov warnings, WizCLI medium findings
  • note: Checkov notes, WizCLI low/informational findings
  • Categories: security IAC
  • Supported material types: SARIF
Inputs

iac-scan-present

Checks that an IaC scan material is present in the attestation. Supports WizCLI and Checkov SARIF reports.
  • Categories: security IAC
  • Supported material types: ATTESTATION

immutable-releases-enabled

Verifies that GitHub Immutable Releases is enabled for the repository. When enabled, published release artifacts and their associated tags cannot be modified or deleted, protecting the integrity of the software supply chain. This is a GitHub-specific feature; the policy skips on GitLab repositories.
  • Categories: security
  • Supported material types: CHAINLOOP_RUNNER_CONTEXT

material-present

Checks that a required material is present in the attestation
  • Categories: compliance
  • Supported material types: ATTESTATION
Inputs

owasp-api-top10-2019

Checks for CWEs included in the OWASP API Security Top 10 (2019) list. Supported Tools:
  • SARIF: Salt Security
  • Categories: security API OWASP
  • Supported material types: SARIF

owasp-api-top10-2023

Checks for CWEs included in the OWASP API Security Top 10 (2023) list. Supported Tools:
  • SARIF: Salt Security
  • Categories: security API OWASP
  • Supported material types: SARIF

owasp-top10-2021

Checks for CWEs included in the OWASP Top10:2021 list. Supported Tools:
  • SARIF: ZAP
  • GitLab Security Reports: SonarQube
  • Categories: security CWE
  • Supported material types: GITLAB_SECURITY_REPORT SARIF

owasp-top10-2025

Checks for CWEs included in the OWASP Top10:2025 list. Supported Tools:
  • SARIF: KICS, SpotBugs, ZAP, StackHawk, Polaris, Semgrep, Opengrep, SonarQube, CodeQL and Salt Security
  • GitLab Security Reports: SonarQube
  • Categories: security CWE
  • Supported material types: GITLAB_SECURITY_REPORT SARIF

patch-policy-present

Verifies that automated patch management tooling is configured and actively monitoring third-party dependencies for known vulnerabilities. On GitHub, checks that Dependabot security updates are enabled via the repository’s security_and_analysis settings. On GitLab, checks for the presence of a Renovate configuration file (renovate.json, renovate.json5, .renovaterc, or .renovaterc.json).
  • Categories: security patch-management
  • Supported material types: CHAINLOOP_RUNNER_CONTEXT

pr-bot-author-allowed

Verifies that a PR/MR was authored by one of the allowed bot accounts. Useful for gating workflows to only accept PRs from automated tools such as Dependabot or Renovate. On GitHub, checks the user type field; on GitLab, reads the author.bot field from the Merge Request API. Defaults to dependabot[bot] and renovate[bot] if no allowed_bots input is provided. These defaults use GitHub-style names; GitLab users should specify their bot usernames explicitly or use GitLab service accounts. See the bot PR guide for platform-specific setup.
  • Categories: security automation
  • Supported material types: CHAINLOOP_PR_INFO
Inputs

pr-code-owner-review-required

Ensures that code owner reviews are required for pull requests. Supports both GitHub and GitLab.
  • Categories: security
  • Supported material types: CHAINLOOP_RUNNER_CONTEXT
Inputs

pr-conversation-resolution-required

Ensures that all conversations in pull requests must be resolved before merging.
  • Categories: security
  • Supported material types: CHAINLOOP_RUNNER_CONTEXT
Inputs

pr-description-required

Ensures PRs/MRs have meaningful descriptions for better code review quality and documentation
  • Categories: Code Review
  • Supported material types: CHAINLOOP_PR_INFO
Inputs

pr-review-required

Ensures that pull requests require a minimum number of reviewers before merging. Supports both GitHub and GitLab.
  • Categories: security
  • Supported material types: CHAINLOOP_RUNNER_CONTEXT
Inputs

pr-stale-reviews-dismissed

Ensures that stale pull request reviews are automatically dismissed when new commits are pushed.
  • Categories: security
  • Supported material types: CHAINLOOP_RUNNER_CONTEXT
Inputs

pr-user-story-linked

Ensures all Pull Requests and Merge Requests reference a user story or issue for traceability
  • Categories: Code Review
  • Supported material types: CHAINLOOP_PR_INFO
Inputs

radamsa-min-iterations

Verify that a radamsa fuzzing run generated at least a minimum number of iterations. Evaluates radamsa’s -M metadata log (RADAMSA_REPORT), where every generated test case is one record, and fails the gate when the run produced fewer iterations than required. Use it to prove a target was fuzzed with meaningful coverage rather than for a token handful of cases.
  • Categories: security compliance
  • Supported material types: RADAMSA_REPORT
Inputs

radamsa-no-crashes

Verify that a radamsa fuzzing run produced no crashing inputs. Chainloop only attaches a RADAMSA_CRASHES material when radamsa actually found crashes — a clean run has nothing to attest — so the mere presence of that material in the attestation is the failure signal.
  • Categories: security compliance
  • Supported material types: ATTESTATION

repository-rules-change-restricted

Validates that only authorized users and teams can modify repository protection rules.
  • Categories: security
  • Supported material types: CHAINLOOP_RUNNER_CONTEXT
Inputs

runner-authenticated

Checks that runner is authenticated by using the OIDC token from the provider.
  • Categories: security SLSA
  • Supported material types: ATTESTATION
  • Auto-match: Yes
Inputs

runner-automated

Checks that the CI runner is the expected one supporting Chainloop attestation.
  • Categories: security SLSA
  • Supported material types: ATTESTATION
Inputs

sast

Check Static Application Security Test (SAST) results for weaknesses. Supported Tools:
  • BlackDuck Polaris (SARIF)
  • Synopsys Coverity (SARIF)
  • CodeQL (SARIF)
  • OpenGrep OSS / Semgrep OSS (SARIF)
  • SonarQube (SARIF, GitLab Security Report format and Search API via EVIDENCE)
  • Spectral / AsyncAPI CLI / graphql-eslint (SARIF, web API spec validation)
  • Categories: security SAST
  • Supported material types: EVIDENCE GITLAB_SECURITY_REPORT SARIF
  • Auto-match: Yes
Inputs

sast-scan-present

Checks that a SAST scan material is present in the attestation. Supports Polaris, Coverity, SonarQube, and CodeQL SARIF reports, SonarQube GitLab Security Reports, and SonarQube Search API evidence.
  • Categories: security SAST
  • Supported material types: ATTESTATION

sbom-banned-components

Checks that the SBOM doesn’t have any banned components. It accepts a list of comma-separated list of components. If a version is specified, it will fail for versions equal or lower. with: components: [email protected], banned-component-name”
  • Categories: sbom security
  • Supported material types: SBOM_CYCLONEDX_JSON
Inputs

sbom-banned-licenses

Checks SBOM components for banned SPDX licenses and custom/proprietary licenses. This policy validates software components against license compliance requirements by detecting specified banned SPDX license identifiers, flagging custom/proprietary licenses by default, and supporting exceptions. Supports CycloneDX 1.5+.
  • Categories: sbom
  • Supported material types: SBOM_CYCLONEDX_JSON
Inputs

sbom-bsi-component-fields

BSI TR-03183-2 §5.2.2/§5.2.4/§5.2.5 — Validates per-component data fields. By default only Required fields (§5.2.2) gate: component creator, name, version, filename, distribution licences, SHA-512 deployable hash. Set the ‘enforce’ input to also gate Additional (§5.2.4 — source/deployable URIs, unique identifiers, declared licences) and/or Optional (§5.2.5 — effective licence, source hash, security.txt URL) categories.
  • Categories: sbom compliance bsi
  • Supported material types: SBOM_CYCLONEDX_JSON
Inputs

sbom-bsi-creator

BSI TR-03183-2 §5.2.1 — SBOM MUST identify its creator by email address or URL. Checks ‘metadata.manufacturer’ and ‘metadata.authors[]’ on the CycloneDX SBOM and ‘metadata.timestamp’.
  • Categories: sbom compliance bsi
  • Supported material types: SBOM_CYCLONEDX_JSON

sbom-bsi-dependencies

BSI TR-03183-2 §5.1 — Every component MUST enumerate its direct dependencies and the SBOM MUST declare dependency-graph completeness via ‘compositions[].aggregate’.
  • Categories: sbom compliance bsi
  • Supported material types: SBOM_CYCLONEDX_JSON

sbom-bsi-format

BSI TR-03183-2 §4 — A newly generated or updated SBOM shall be a valid CycloneDX document in JSON format, version 1.6 or higher. Fires a violation for CycloneDX below 1.6.
  • Categories: sbom compliance bsi
  • Supported material types: SBOM_CYCLONEDX_JSON

sbom-bsi-licenses

BSI TR-03183-2 §6.1 — Licence identifiers MUST use SPDX expressions. Validates that every component licence uses a valid SPDX ID, a ‘LicenseRef-’ / ‘LicenseRef-scancode-’ reference, or an SPDX expression using only AND/OR/WITH operators.
  • Categories: sbom compliance bsi
  • Supported material types: SBOM_CYCLONEDX_JSON

sbom-bsi-no-vulns

BSI TR-03183-2 §3.1 — SBOMs MUST NOT contain vulnerability information. Vulnerabilities belong in a separate VEX document.
  • Categories: sbom compliance bsi
  • Supported material types: SBOM_CYCLONEDX_JSON

sbom-bsi-properties

BSI TR-03183-2 §5.2.2 — Components MUST declare BSI taxonomy properties classifying them as executable/non-executable, archive/no archive, and structured/unstructured.
  • Categories: sbom compliance bsi
  • Supported material types: SBOM_CYCLONEDX_JSON

sbom-bsi-sbom-uri

BSI TR-03183-2 §5.2.3 Additional — Each SBOM SHOULD carry a unique identifier (SBOM-URI). For CycloneDX this is the ‘serialNumber’ field in BOM-Link format (urn:uuid:…). The SBOM-URI is an Additional data field; this policy is silent by default. Set ‘enforce’ to ‘additional’ to surface violations and gate on absence.
  • Categories: sbom compliance bsi
  • Supported material types: SBOM_CYCLONEDX_JSON
Inputs

sbom-freshness

Checks that the SBOM is not older than a specified threshold. Supports CycloneDX. It accepts a limit argument denoting the number of days. If not provided, it will deactivate the policy: with: limit: 20
  • Categories: sbom
  • Supported material types: SBOM_CYCLONEDX_JSON
  • Auto-match: Yes
Inputs

sbom-ntia

Checks SBOM reports for NTIA SBOM Minimum Elements Report. Supports SPDX 2.3 and CycloneDX 1.4+. The policy ignores local files that do not originate from a package manager, such as a local script injected into the build process.
  • Categories: security sbom
  • Supported material types: SBOM_CYCLONEDX_JSON SBOM_SPDX_JSON

sbom-present

Checks that either a SPDX or CycloneDX SBOM material is present in the attestation
  • Categories: sbom
  • Supported material types: ATTESTATION

sbom-version

Verifies that the given SBOM report complies with a particular version or higher. It requires a version argument (default value for CycloneDX: 1.4)
  • Categories: sbom
  • Supported material types: SBOM_CYCLONEDX_JSON
Inputs

sbom-with-licenses

Checks for components with unknown licenses in the CycloneDX report
  • Categories: sbom
  • Supported material types: SBOM_CYCLONEDX_JSON
Inputs

sca-scan-present

Checks that a Software Composition Analysis (SCA) material is present in the attestation. Compatible with SPDX, CycloneDX and BlackDuck SCA formats
  • Categories: security compliance
  • Supported material types: ATTESTATION

secrets-detection

Checks secrets scanning reports for leaked secrets. Supports GitLab, GHAS, Gitleaks, and detect-secrets reports
  • Categories: security secrets
  • Supported material types: GHAS_SECRET_SCAN GITLAB_SECURITY_REPORT GITLEAKS_JSON YELP_DETECT_SECRETS_BASELINE

signature-present

Checks that SLSA provenance signature is possibly present by verifying the CA and TSA presence.
  • Categories: security SLSA
  • Supported material types: ATTESTATION
Inputs

source-commit

Verifies that the attestation explicitly references a specific Git commit
  • Supported material types: ATTESTATION
Inputs

tag-deletion-blocked

Ensures that tag deletion is blocked to protect release tags from being removed or replaced. Supports both GitHub and GitLab.
  • Categories: security
  • Supported material types: CHAINLOOP_RUNNER_CONTEXT
Inputs

tag-force-push-blocked

Ensures that force pushes are blocked on tags to prevent tag manipulation attacks (such as the Trivy supply chain attack). Supports both GitHub and GitLab.
  • Categories: security
  • Supported material types: CHAINLOOP_RUNNER_CONTEXT
Inputs

tag-rules-change-restricted

Validates that only authorized actors can bypass tag protection rules. Checks bypass_configuration on tag rulesets to ensure only approved roles, teams, or users can bypass protections. Supports GitHub only (GitLab tag protection uses access levels checked via create_access_levels).
  • Categories: security
  • Supported material types: CHAINLOOP_RUNNER_CONTEXT
Inputs

trusted-binaries-authenticode-signed

DEPRECATED: use trusted-binaries-signed instead. As of trusted-binaries-signed v2 the extension filter is optional, so that policy now covers this exact check — omit extensions to check every in-scope file (this policy’s behavior), or supply extensions to restrict to specific file types. This policy is retained only for backward compatibility and will be removed in a future release. Verifies that binaries listed in a Sysinternals sigcheck manifest are digitally signed and that the signature belongs to an expected publisher. For every in-scope file the policy raises a violation when the file is not signed, or when it is signed by a publisher other than the expected one. The expected publisher is matched (case-insensitive substring) against both the sigcheck Publisher (the Authenticode signer) and Company columns, since the two often carry slightly different forms of the same organization name. Use paths / ignored_paths to scope the check to the binaries that must be signed (for example, excluding operating-system files). The signature attributes are the only thing derivable from the manifest; complementary controls such as malware scanning or chain-of-custody are evidenced by the manifest itself, not enforced here.
  • Categories: security binaries compliance
  • Supported material types: SYSINTERNALS_SIGCHECK
Inputs

trusted-binaries-signed

Verifies that the binaries built for a product are digitally signed. By default the check applies to every in-scope file. Supply extensions to restrict it to a specific set of file types (for example, the Authenticode-supported exe,dll,ocx,ctl,cat,cab,msi,xpi). Every in-scope file that is not signed raises a violation. When publisher is set, in-scope files must additionally be signed by one of the expected publishers, matched (case-insensitive substring) against both the sigcheck Publisher and Company columns. Use paths / ignored_paths to restrict the check to the files produced by the build (for example, the installation directory), and extensions to limit it to specific file types. Changelog:
  • v2 (behavior change): the extensions filter is now optional. Omitting it no longer applies the built-in Authenticode extension set — instead all in-scope files are checked. Supply extensions explicitly to restrict the check to specific file types.
  • Categories: security binaries compliance
  • Supported material types: SYSINTERNALS_SIGCHECK
Inputs

trusted-binaries-timestamp

Verifies that signed binaries in a Sysinternals sigcheck manifest carry a signature timestamp. For every in-scope file that is signed, the policy raises a violation when the sigcheck Date column (the signing timestamp) is empty or n/a. Unsigned files are ignored, since there is no signature to timestamp. The manifest must include the Date column for the check to be meaningful: if no record carries a Date column the policy is skipped rather than reporting false positives, so run sigcheck with its default columns (the Date column is included by default).
  • Categories: security binaries compliance
  • Supported material types: SYSINTERNALS_SIGCHECK
Inputs

trusted-binaries-vendor-keys

Verifies that third-party / redistributed binaries are not signed with the organization’s own signing key. Third-party components must be redistributed with the signature (or lack thereof) established by the party that built them; they must never be re-signed with the organization’s key. The policy flags any file under third_party_paths that is signed and whose Publisher or Company column matches the organization identity given in publisher. Matching is case-insensitive substring against both columns, so slightly different forms of the same organization name (for example Contoso Inc vs Contoso, Inc.) are both detected.
  • Categories: security binaries compliance
  • Supported material types: SYSINTERNALS_SIGCHECK
Inputs

vulnerabilities

Checks that the vulnerability severity or score, found in a vulnerabilities report, are above an input threshold. It supports a CVSS “score” input for numeric threshold, or “severity” for text-based severity. Compatible with SARIF (Trivy, Grype, Stackhawk, Prisma Cloud, WizCLI and Snyk), BlackDuck and TwistCLI formats
  • Categories: security CVE
  • Supported material types: BLACKDUCK_SCA_JSON GHAS_DEPENDENCY_SCAN SARIF SBOM_CYCLONEDX_JSON TWISTCLI_SCAN_JSON
  • Auto-match: Yes
Inputs

vulnerability-scan-present

Checks that a supported SCA scan material is present in the attestation. Compatible with SARIF (Trivy, Grype, Stackhawk, TwistCLI, Snyk and WizCLI), BlackDuck, GHAS Dependency Scan and CycloneDX with vulnerabilities formats
  • Categories: security CVE
  • Supported material types: ATTESTATION

webapi-validation-clean

Evaluates SARIF 2.1.0 web API validation reports and checks for results at or above a severity threshold. Default threshold is error. Can be set to warning or note to catch lower-severity issues. Extracts the tool name from runs[0].tool.driver.name for reporting.
  • Categories: security API
  • Supported material types: SARIF
Inputs

webapi-validation-present

Checks that a web API specification material is present in the attestation. Supports OpenAPI, AsyncAPI, and GraphQL specifications.
  • Categories: security API
  • Supported material types: ATTESTATION

webserver-response-headers

Gates an OWASP ZAP (DAST) SARIF report on the presence of one or more specific ZAP rule IDs. Configure the rule ID(s) via the zap_rule_ids input (comma-separated); the presence of any configured rule ID in the report is a violation. This is a generic, fine-grained gate: point it at the exact ZAP rule ID(s) you care about instead of a broad CWE bucket. One common use is gating individual webserver response-header checks (X-Content-Type-Options, HSTS, CSP, Permissions-Policy, HttpOnly, SameSite, fingerprinting) independently, since each maps to a distinct ZAP rule ID. Reads rule IDs directly, so it works across ZAP 2.15 – 2.17+ regardless of the version-dependent CWE taxonomy. ZAP’s “-N” alert-variant suffix is stripped before matching (so “10038-1” matches a configured “10038”). Supported Tools:
  • SARIF: OWASP ZAP (2.15 – 2.17+)
  • Categories: security DAST
  • Supported material types: SARIF
Inputs

Policy Groups

branch-protection

This policy group enforces branch protection rules to ensure repository integrity. It includes policies that prevent branch deletion, force pushes, enforce linear history, and restrict who can modify protection rules. Supports both GitHub and GitLab. Read more about how to generate the needed material in the documentation.
  • Categories: security
Inputs
Material Policies

code-review

This policy group enforces code review requirements to ensure code quality. It includes policies that require pull request reviews and dismissal of stale reviews. Supports both GitHub and GitLab. Read more about how to generate the needed material in the documentation.
  • Categories: security
Inputs
Material Policies

cwes

This policy group applies CWE-related policies: CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses and CWE On the Cusp (ranked 26–40). Use it to enforce that source or dependency scans are free from these common weaknesses.
  • Categories: security CWE
Material Policies

pr-quality

This policy group enforces pull request quality standards to ensure proper documentation and traceability. It includes policies that require meaningful PR descriptions and links to user stories or issues. Supports both GitHub and GitLab. Read more about how to capture PR information in the documentation.
  • Categories: quality
Inputs
Material Policies

pr-validation

Unified PR validation policy group covering both bot-authored and human-authored PRs. Policies self-select based on author type: bot-specific policies skip for human authors and vice versa. Supports both GitHub and GitLab. Read more about how to capture PR information in the documentation.
  • Categories: quality security automation
Inputs
Attestation Policies
Material Policies

sast

This policy group applies Static Application Security Testing (SAST) related policies.
  • Categories: security SAST
Inputs
Attestation Policies
Material Policies

sbom-quality

This policy group applies a number of SBOM-related policies
  • Categories: SBOM
Inputs
Attestation Policies
Material Policies

slsa-checks

This policy group applies a number of SLSA-related policies.
  • Categories: SLSA
Inputs
Attestation Policies

tag-protection

This policy group enforces tag protection rules to prevent tag manipulation attacks such as the Trivy supply chain attack. It includes policies that prevent tag deletion, force pushes on tags, and restrict who can bypass tag protection rules. Supports both GitHub and GitLab. Read more about how to generate the needed material in the documentation.
  • Categories: security
Inputs
Material Policies

vulnerability-management

This policy group applies vulnerability management related policies.
  • Categories: security CVE
Inputs
Attestation Policies
Material Policies