This feature is only available on Chainloop’s platform paid plans.
Policies
activex-controls-fuzzed
Verify that Windows ActiveX/COM controls were fuzz-tested with the CERT/CC Dranzer tool and that no control failed, hung, or crashed during the run. Any failed or hung object, or any crash finding (access violation, Win32 exception, or error), is a candidate for!Exploitable triage and must be
remediated prior to Product release.
- Categories:
securitycompliance - Supported material types:
CERTCC_DRANZER
ai-agent-present
Checks for AI agent presence via configuration materials in the attestation or known bot reviewers on the PR- Categories:
ai - Supported material types:
ATTESTATIONCHAINLOOP_PR_INFO
ai-config-ai-agents-allowed
Verifies that the AI agent in the configuration is in the allowed list- Categories:
ai - Supported material types:
CHAINLOOP_AI_AGENT_CONFIGCHAINLOOP_AI_CODING_SESSION
Inputs
ai-config-mcp-servers-allowed
Verifies that all MCP servers configured in an AI agent configuration or invoked during an AI coding session are in the allowed list- Categories:
ai - Supported material types:
CHAINLOOP_AI_AGENT_CONFIGCHAINLOOP_AI_CODING_SESSION
Inputs
ai-config-no-dangerous-commands
Detects dangerous or destructive shell commands in AI coding session transcripts (assistant Bash tool calls) and AI agent configuration files (instructions, skills, subagents, MCP config)- Categories:
ai - Supported material types:
CHAINLOOP_AI_AGENT_CONFIGCHAINLOOP_AI_CODING_SESSION
Inputs
ai-config-no-secrets
Verifies that AI agent configuration files (instructions, skills, MCP config) and AI coding session transcripts do not contain hardcoded secrets such as API keys, tokens, passwords, or credentials- Categories:
ai - Supported material types:
CHAINLOOP_AI_AGENT_CONFIGCHAINLOOP_AI_CODING_SESSION
Inputs
ai-instructions-architecture-with-paths
Verifies that AI agent instruction files describe the project architecture by referencing at least one directory path and naming an architectural pattern- Categories:
ai - Supported material types:
CHAINLOOP_AI_AGENT_CONFIG
Inputs
ai-instructions-code-style-specificity
Verifies that AI agent instruction files contain at least one concrete, project-specific code style rule referencing a specific linter, formatter, or language pattern- Categories:
ai - Supported material types:
CHAINLOOP_AI_AGENT_CONFIG
Inputs
ai-instructions-commands-documented
Verifies that AI agent instruction files specify exact, executable commands for each required action rather than vague instructions- Categories:
ai - Supported material types:
CHAINLOOP_AI_AGENT_CONFIG
Inputs
ai-instructions-doc-guidance
Verifies that AI agent instruction files reference documentation practices — where docs live, what format to use, and how to keep READMEs and inline comments relevant- Categories:
ai - Supported material types:
CHAINLOOP_AI_AGENT_CONFIG
Inputs
ai-instructions-explicit-boundaries
Verifies that AI agent instruction files define explicit behavioral boundaries — concrete paths or actions the agent must not access or perform- Categories:
ai - Supported material types:
CHAINLOOP_AI_AGENT_CONFIG
Inputs
ai-instructions-git-workflow-documented
Verifies that AI agent instruction files document at least two git workflow conventions — branch naming, commit message format, or PR requirements- Categories:
ai - Supported material types:
CHAINLOOP_AI_AGENT_CONFIG
Inputs
ai-instructions-gotchas
Verifies that AI agent instruction files document at least two project-specific gotchas — non-obvious behaviors, edge cases, or pitfalls the agent would get wrong without explicit guidance- Categories:
ai - Supported material types:
CHAINLOOP_AI_AGENT_CONFIG
Inputs
ai-instructions-size-bounds
Checks that each instruction/skill file in an AI agent configuration has a line count within configurable bounds (instructions default max 200, skills default max 500)- Categories:
ai - Supported material types:
CHAINLOOP_AI_AGENT_CONFIG - Auto-match: Yes
Inputs
ai-instructions-verification-criteria
Verifies that AI agent instruction files include verification mechanisms such as unit tests, executable test commands, or expected input/output examples- Categories:
ai - Supported material types:
CHAINLOOP_AI_AGENT_CONFIG
Inputs
ai-skills-descriptions-actionable
Verifies that each AI agent skill describes what it does, when to use it, and what problems it solves- Categories:
ai - Supported material types:
CHAINLOOP_AI_AGENT_CONFIG
Inputs
ai-subagents-descriptions-actionable
Verifies that each AI agent subagent has a description specifying trigger, scope, and purpose, and that system prompts are substantive- Categories:
ai - Supported material types:
CHAINLOOP_AI_AGENT_CONFIG
Inputs
ai-subagents-permissions-scope
Verifies that no subagent sets permissionMode to bypassPermissions or declares MCP servers absent from parent configuration- Categories:
ai - Supported material types:
CHAINLOOP_AI_AGENT_CONFIG
api-security
Check API security posture findings for weaknesses above a severity threshold. Supported Tools:- Salt Security (SARIF, API posture gaps)
- Categories:
securityAPI - Supported material types:
SARIF
Inputs
api-security-scan-present
Checks that an API security scan material is present in the attestation. Supports Salt Security SARIF reports.- Categories:
securityAPI - Supported material types:
ATTESTATION
artifact-signed
Checks that the provided piece of evidence has a signature- Categories:
securitysigning - Supported material types:
CONTAINER_IMAGEHELM_CHART
artifact-tag-not-latest
Checks that the provided OCI artifact hasn’t been tagged with the latest tag.- Categories:
security - Supported material types:
CONTAINER_IMAGE
binary-compiler-hardening
Checks BinSkim compiler-hardening results (ASLR, secure tools, critical warnings, …) for every analyzed binary. A binary BinSkim could not evaluate because its PDB (debug symbols) could not be loaded (E_PDB_NOT_FOUND) always fails: its hardening configuration cannot be verified without symbols. For binaries that were analyzed, the policy raises a violation for each hardening rule finding that matches the configured rules and meets the severity threshold.
Supports BinSkim SARIF format.
- Categories:
securitybinaries - Supported material types:
SARIF
Inputs
binary-scan
Checks binary scan reports for security and correctness errors, including BinSkim tool notifications (e.g. PDB-load failures that prevent a binary from being analyzed). Supports BinSkim SARIF format.- Categories:
securitybinaries - Supported material types:
SARIF
Inputs
binary-symbols-stripped
Verifies that release binaries in a BinSkim SARIF report are stripped of debug symbols. BinSkim reports a binary it could not analyze because its PDB (debug symbols) could not be loaded as anERR997.ExceptionLoadingPdb / E_PDB_NOT_FOUND tool notification. This policy treats that as the desired state: a stripped release binary. Conversely, any binary BinSkim was able to analyze (its PDB loaded, so debug symbols are present) raises a violation.
Each scanned binary is evaluated individually. The set of scanned binaries is taken from the report’s artifacts list when present, falling back to the binaries referenced by analysis results.
- Categories:
securitybinaries - Supported material types:
SARIF
Inputs
branch-deletion-blocked
Ensures that branch deletion is blocked to protect important branches from accidental deletion. Supports both GitHub and GitLab.- Categories:
security - Supported material types:
CHAINLOOP_RUNNER_CONTEXT
Inputs
branch-force-push-blocked
Ensures that force pushes are blocked on branches to prevent bypassing code review and history integrity. Supports both GitHub and GitLab.- Categories:
security - Supported material types:
CHAINLOOP_RUNNER_CONTEXT
Inputs
branch-linear-history-required
Ensures that branches require linear history to prevent merge commits and maintain a clean commit history.- Categories:
security - Supported material types:
CHAINLOOP_RUNNER_CONTEXT
Inputs
check-compliance-requirement
Checks that the project passes the compliance requirement- Categories:
compliance - Supported material types:
ATTESTATION
Inputs
ci-pipeline-security
Checks CI/CD pipeline configuration security scan results for findings. Supported Tools:- zizmor (SARIF) — GitHub Actions workflow security auditor
- Categories:
securityCI/CD - Supported material types:
SARIF
Inputs
ci-user-strongly-authenticated
Ensures that CI users have strong authentication enabled, including two-factor authentication and verified accounts. Only applies to GitHub provider.- Categories:
security - Supported material types:
CHAINLOOP_RUNNER_CONTEXT
code-coverage
Checks a code coverage report against a given percentage threshold. It uses JaCoCo counters as in JaCoCo Documentation- Categories:
coverageSAST - Supported material types:
JACOCO_XML - Auto-match: Yes
Inputs
commits-signed-required
Ensures that all commits are signed to verify their authenticity and integrity.- Categories:
security - Supported material types:
CHAINLOOP_RUNNER_CONTEXT
Inputs
containers-with-sbom
Ensures all OCI container images have an associated SBOM material. Only the CycloneDX SBOM format is supported. SBOMs generated by Syft using the ‘latest’ tag are not recognized and will result in a policy violation.- Categories:
sbomcontainer - Supported material types:
ATTESTATION
Inputs
cves-in-kev
Checks a CVE report against CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities KEV Catalog. Supports Trivy’s SARIF, Blackduck, GHAS Dependency Scans and CycloneDX SBOM outputs.- Categories:
securityCVE - Supported material types:
BLACKDUCK_SCA_JSONGHAS_DEPENDENCY_SCANSARIFSBOM_CYCLONEDX_JSON
cwe-top25
Checks for CWEs in the 2025 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses list. See the CWE Top 25 for the complete list. Supported Tools:- SARIF: KICS, SpotBugs, ZAP, StackHawk, Polaris, Semgrep, Opengrep, SonarQube, CodeQL and Salt Security
- GitLab Security Reports: Native GitLab, SonarQube
- Other: CSAF Security Advisory, BlackDuck SCA, GitHub Advanced Security Dependency Scan
- Categories:
securityCWE - Supported material types:
BLACKDUCK_SCA_JSONCSAF_SECURITY_ADVISORYGHAS_DEPENDENCY_SCANGITLAB_SECURITY_REPORTSARIF
cwe-top26-40-cusp
Checks a vulnerability report for CWEs in the 2026 CWE On the Cusp list (CWEs ranked 26-40). See the CWE On the Cusp for the complete list. Supported Tools:- SARIF: KICS, SpotBugs, ZAP, StackHawk, Polaris, Semgrep, Opengrep, SonarQube, CodeQL and Salt Security
- GitLab Security Reports: Native GitLab, SonarQube
- Other: BlackDuck SCA, GitHub Advanced Security Dependency Scan
- Categories:
securityCWE - Supported material types:
BLACKDUCK_SCA_JSONGHAS_DEPENDENCY_SCANGITLAB_SECURITY_REPORTSARIF
evidence-prompt
Analyzes evidence using an AI-powered prompt. Leverages any OpenAI or Anthropic API integration you have set up in your organization to perform prompt-based analysis of materials (e.g., SBOMs).- Categories:
securitycompliance - Supported material types:
ATTESTATIONBLACKDUCK_SCA_JSONCHAINLOOP_PR_INFOCHAINLOOP_RUNNER_CONTEXTCONTAINER_IMAGECSAF_SECURITY_ADVISORYEVIDENCEGHAS_DEPENDENCY_SCANGHAS_SECRET_SCANGITLAB_SECURITY_REPORTGITLEAKS_JSONHELM_CHARTJACOCO_XMLSARIFSBOM_CYCLONEDX_JSONSBOM_SPDX_JSONTWISTCLI_SCAN_JSON
Inputs
iac-misconfiguration
Checks for misconfigurations in IAC (infrastructure as code) sources. Supports SARIF from Checkov and WizCLI. Both tools map their native severity to the standard SARIFresult.level field:
error: Checkov errors, WizCLI high/critical findingswarning: Checkov warnings, WizCLI medium findingsnote: Checkov notes, WizCLI low/informational findings
- Categories:
securityIAC - Supported material types:
SARIF
Inputs
iac-scan-present
Checks that an IaC scan material is present in the attestation. Supports WizCLI and Checkov SARIF reports.- Categories:
securityIAC - Supported material types:
ATTESTATION
immutable-releases-enabled
Verifies that GitHub Immutable Releases is enabled for the repository. When enabled, published release artifacts and their associated tags cannot be modified or deleted, protecting the integrity of the software supply chain. This is a GitHub-specific feature; the policy skips on GitLab repositories.- Categories:
security - Supported material types:
CHAINLOOP_RUNNER_CONTEXT
material-present
Checks that a required material is present in the attestation- Categories:
compliance - Supported material types:
ATTESTATION
Inputs
owasp-api-top10-2019
Checks for CWEs included in the OWASP API Security Top 10 (2019) list. Supported Tools:- SARIF: Salt Security
- Categories:
securityAPIOWASP - Supported material types:
SARIF
owasp-api-top10-2023
Checks for CWEs included in the OWASP API Security Top 10 (2023) list. Supported Tools:- SARIF: Salt Security
- Categories:
securityAPIOWASP - Supported material types:
SARIF
owasp-top10-2021
Checks for CWEs included in the OWASP Top10:2021 list. Supported Tools:- SARIF: ZAP
- GitLab Security Reports: SonarQube
- Categories:
securityCWE - Supported material types:
GITLAB_SECURITY_REPORTSARIF
owasp-top10-2025
Checks for CWEs included in the OWASP Top10:2025 list. Supported Tools:- SARIF: KICS, SpotBugs, ZAP, StackHawk, Polaris, Semgrep, Opengrep, SonarQube, CodeQL and Salt Security
- GitLab Security Reports: SonarQube
- Categories:
securityCWE - Supported material types:
GITLAB_SECURITY_REPORTSARIF
patch-policy-present
Verifies that automated patch management tooling is configured and actively monitoring third-party dependencies for known vulnerabilities. On GitHub, checks that Dependabot security updates are enabled via the repository’s security_and_analysis settings. On GitLab, checks for the presence of a Renovate configuration file (renovate.json, renovate.json5, .renovaterc, or .renovaterc.json).- Categories:
securitypatch-management - Supported material types:
CHAINLOOP_RUNNER_CONTEXT
pr-bot-author-allowed
Verifies that a PR/MR was authored by one of the allowed bot accounts. Useful for gating workflows to only accept PRs from automated tools such as Dependabot or Renovate. On GitHub, checks the user type field; on GitLab, reads the author.bot field from the Merge Request API. Defaults to dependabot[bot] and renovate[bot] if no allowed_bots input is provided. These defaults use GitHub-style names; GitLab users should specify their bot usernames explicitly or use GitLab service accounts. See the bot PR guide for platform-specific setup.- Categories:
securityautomation - Supported material types:
CHAINLOOP_PR_INFO
Inputs
pr-code-owner-review-required
Ensures that code owner reviews are required for pull requests. Supports both GitHub and GitLab.- Categories:
security - Supported material types:
CHAINLOOP_RUNNER_CONTEXT
Inputs
pr-conversation-resolution-required
Ensures that all conversations in pull requests must be resolved before merging.- Categories:
security - Supported material types:
CHAINLOOP_RUNNER_CONTEXT
Inputs
pr-description-required
Ensures PRs/MRs have meaningful descriptions for better code review quality and documentation- Categories:
Code Review - Supported material types:
CHAINLOOP_PR_INFO
Inputs
pr-review-required
Ensures that pull requests require a minimum number of reviewers before merging. Supports both GitHub and GitLab.- Categories:
security - Supported material types:
CHAINLOOP_RUNNER_CONTEXT
Inputs
pr-stale-reviews-dismissed
Ensures that stale pull request reviews are automatically dismissed when new commits are pushed.- Categories:
security - Supported material types:
CHAINLOOP_RUNNER_CONTEXT
Inputs
pr-user-story-linked
Ensures all Pull Requests and Merge Requests reference a user story or issue for traceability- Categories:
Code Review - Supported material types:
CHAINLOOP_PR_INFO
Inputs
radamsa-min-iterations
Verify that a radamsa fuzzing run generated at least a minimum number of iterations. Evaluates radamsa’s-M metadata log (RADAMSA_REPORT), where
every generated test case is one record, and fails the gate when the run
produced fewer iterations than required. Use it to prove a target was
fuzzed with meaningful coverage rather than for a token handful of cases.
- Categories:
securitycompliance - Supported material types:
RADAMSA_REPORT
Inputs
radamsa-no-crashes
Verify that a radamsa fuzzing run produced no crashing inputs. Chainloop only attaches a RADAMSA_CRASHES material when radamsa actually found crashes — a clean run has nothing to attest — so the mere presence of that material in the attestation is the failure signal.- Categories:
securitycompliance - Supported material types:
ATTESTATION
repository-rules-change-restricted
Validates that only authorized users and teams can modify repository protection rules.- Categories:
security - Supported material types:
CHAINLOOP_RUNNER_CONTEXT
Inputs
runner-authenticated
Checks that runner is authenticated by using the OIDC token from the provider.- Categories:
securitySLSA - Supported material types:
ATTESTATION - Auto-match: Yes
Inputs
runner-automated
Checks that the CI runner is the expected one supporting Chainloop attestation.- Categories:
securitySLSA - Supported material types:
ATTESTATION
Inputs
sast
Check Static Application Security Test (SAST) results for weaknesses. Supported Tools:- BlackDuck Polaris (SARIF)
- Synopsys Coverity (SARIF)
- CodeQL (SARIF)
- OpenGrep OSS / Semgrep OSS (SARIF)
- SonarQube (SARIF, GitLab Security Report format and Search API via EVIDENCE)
- Spectral / AsyncAPI CLI / graphql-eslint (SARIF, web API spec validation)
- Categories:
securitySAST - Supported material types:
EVIDENCEGITLAB_SECURITY_REPORTSARIF - Auto-match: Yes
Inputs
sast-scan-present
Checks that a SAST scan material is present in the attestation. Supports Polaris, Coverity, SonarQube, and CodeQL SARIF reports, SonarQube GitLab Security Reports, and SonarQube Search API evidence.- Categories:
securitySAST - Supported material types:
ATTESTATION
sbom-banned-components
Checks that the SBOM doesn’t have any banned components. It accepts a list of comma-separated list of components. If a version is specified, it will fail for versions equal or lower. with: components: [email protected], banned-component-name”- Categories:
sbomsecurity - Supported material types:
SBOM_CYCLONEDX_JSON
Inputs
sbom-banned-licenses
Checks SBOM components for banned SPDX licenses and custom/proprietary licenses. This policy validates software components against license compliance requirements by detecting specified banned SPDX license identifiers, flagging custom/proprietary licenses by default, and supporting exceptions. Supports CycloneDX 1.5+.- Categories:
sbom - Supported material types:
SBOM_CYCLONEDX_JSON
Inputs
sbom-bsi-component-fields
BSI TR-03183-2 §5.2.2/§5.2.4/§5.2.5 — Validates per-component data fields. By default only Required fields (§5.2.2) gate: component creator, name, version, filename, distribution licences, SHA-512 deployable hash. Set the ‘enforce’ input to also gate Additional (§5.2.4 — source/deployable URIs, unique identifiers, declared licences) and/or Optional (§5.2.5 — effective licence, source hash, security.txt URL) categories.- Categories:
sbomcompliancebsi - Supported material types:
SBOM_CYCLONEDX_JSON
Inputs
sbom-bsi-creator
BSI TR-03183-2 §5.2.1 — SBOM MUST identify its creator by email address or URL. Checks ‘metadata.manufacturer’ and ‘metadata.authors[]’ on the CycloneDX SBOM and ‘metadata.timestamp’.- Categories:
sbomcompliancebsi - Supported material types:
SBOM_CYCLONEDX_JSON
sbom-bsi-dependencies
BSI TR-03183-2 §5.1 — Every component MUST enumerate its direct dependencies and the SBOM MUST declare dependency-graph completeness via ‘compositions[].aggregate’.- Categories:
sbomcompliancebsi - Supported material types:
SBOM_CYCLONEDX_JSON
sbom-bsi-format
BSI TR-03183-2 §4 — A newly generated or updated SBOM shall be a valid CycloneDX document in JSON format, version 1.6 or higher. Fires a violation for CycloneDX below 1.6.- Categories:
sbomcompliancebsi - Supported material types:
SBOM_CYCLONEDX_JSON
sbom-bsi-licenses
BSI TR-03183-2 §6.1 — Licence identifiers MUST use SPDX expressions. Validates that every component licence uses a valid SPDX ID, a ‘LicenseRef-’ / ‘LicenseRef-scancode-’ reference, or an SPDX expression using only AND/OR/WITH operators.- Categories:
sbomcompliancebsi - Supported material types:
SBOM_CYCLONEDX_JSON
sbom-bsi-no-vulns
BSI TR-03183-2 §3.1 — SBOMs MUST NOT contain vulnerability information. Vulnerabilities belong in a separate VEX document.- Categories:
sbomcompliancebsi - Supported material types:
SBOM_CYCLONEDX_JSON
sbom-bsi-properties
BSI TR-03183-2 §5.2.2 — Components MUST declare BSI taxonomy properties classifying them as executable/non-executable, archive/no archive, and structured/unstructured.- Categories:
sbomcompliancebsi - Supported material types:
SBOM_CYCLONEDX_JSON
sbom-bsi-sbom-uri
BSI TR-03183-2 §5.2.3 Additional — Each SBOM SHOULD carry a unique identifier (SBOM-URI). For CycloneDX this is the ‘serialNumber’ field in BOM-Link format (urn:uuid:…). The SBOM-URI is an Additional data field; this policy is silent by default. Set ‘enforce’ to ‘additional’ to surface violations and gate on absence.- Categories:
sbomcompliancebsi - Supported material types:
SBOM_CYCLONEDX_JSON
Inputs
sbom-freshness
Checks that the SBOM is not older than a specified threshold. Supports CycloneDX. It accepts a limit argument denoting the number of days. If not provided, it will deactivate the policy: with: limit: 20- Categories:
sbom - Supported material types:
SBOM_CYCLONEDX_JSON - Auto-match: Yes
Inputs
sbom-ntia
Checks SBOM reports for NTIA SBOM Minimum Elements Report. Supports SPDX 2.3 and CycloneDX 1.4+. The policy ignores local files that do not originate from a package manager, such as a local script injected into the build process.- Categories:
securitysbom - Supported material types:
SBOM_CYCLONEDX_JSONSBOM_SPDX_JSON
sbom-present
Checks that either a SPDX or CycloneDX SBOM material is present in the attestation- Categories:
sbom - Supported material types:
ATTESTATION
sbom-version
Verifies that the given SBOM report complies with a particular version or higher. It requires a version argument (default value for CycloneDX: 1.4)- Categories:
sbom - Supported material types:
SBOM_CYCLONEDX_JSON
Inputs
sbom-with-licenses
Checks for components with unknown licenses in the CycloneDX report- Categories:
sbom - Supported material types:
SBOM_CYCLONEDX_JSON
Inputs
sca-scan-present
Checks that a Software Composition Analysis (SCA) material is present in the attestation. Compatible with SPDX, CycloneDX and BlackDuck SCA formats- Categories:
securitycompliance - Supported material types:
ATTESTATION
secrets-detection
Checks secrets scanning reports for leaked secrets. Supports GitLab, GHAS, Gitleaks, and detect-secrets reports- Categories:
securitysecrets - Supported material types:
GHAS_SECRET_SCANGITLAB_SECURITY_REPORTGITLEAKS_JSONYELP_DETECT_SECRETS_BASELINE
signature-present
Checks that SLSA provenance signature is possibly present by verifying the CA and TSA presence.- Categories:
securitySLSA - Supported material types:
ATTESTATION
Inputs
source-commit
Verifies that the attestation explicitly references a specific Git commit- Supported material types:
ATTESTATION
Inputs
tag-deletion-blocked
Ensures that tag deletion is blocked to protect release tags from being removed or replaced. Supports both GitHub and GitLab.- Categories:
security - Supported material types:
CHAINLOOP_RUNNER_CONTEXT
Inputs
tag-force-push-blocked
Ensures that force pushes are blocked on tags to prevent tag manipulation attacks (such as the Trivy supply chain attack). Supports both GitHub and GitLab.- Categories:
security - Supported material types:
CHAINLOOP_RUNNER_CONTEXT
Inputs
tag-rules-change-restricted
Validates that only authorized actors can bypass tag protection rules. Checks bypass_configuration on tag rulesets to ensure only approved roles, teams, or users can bypass protections. Supports GitHub only (GitLab tag protection uses access levels checked via create_access_levels).- Categories:
security - Supported material types:
CHAINLOOP_RUNNER_CONTEXT
Inputs
trusted-binaries-authenticode-signed
DEPRECATED: usetrusted-binaries-signed instead. As of trusted-binaries-signed v2 the extension filter is optional, so that policy now covers this exact check — omit extensions to check every in-scope file (this policy’s behavior), or supply extensions to restrict to specific file types. This policy is retained only for backward compatibility and will be removed in a future release.
Verifies that binaries listed in a Sysinternals sigcheck manifest are digitally signed and that the signature belongs to an expected publisher.
For every in-scope file the policy raises a violation when the file is not signed, or when it is signed by a publisher other than the expected one. The expected publisher is matched (case-insensitive substring) against both the sigcheck Publisher (the Authenticode signer) and Company columns, since the two often carry slightly different forms of the same organization name.
Use paths / ignored_paths to scope the check to the binaries that must be signed (for example, excluding operating-system files). The signature attributes are the only thing derivable from the manifest; complementary controls such as malware scanning or chain-of-custody are evidenced by the manifest itself, not enforced here.
- Categories:
securitybinariescompliance - Supported material types:
SYSINTERNALS_SIGCHECK
Inputs
trusted-binaries-signed
Verifies that the binaries built for a product are digitally signed. By default the check applies to every in-scope file. Supplyextensions to restrict it to a specific set of file types (for example, the Authenticode-supported exe,dll,ocx,ctl,cat,cab,msi,xpi). Every in-scope file that is not signed raises a violation. When publisher is set, in-scope files must additionally be signed by one of the expected publishers, matched (case-insensitive substring) against both the sigcheck Publisher and Company columns.
Use paths / ignored_paths to restrict the check to the files produced by the build (for example, the installation directory), and extensions to limit it to specific file types.
Changelog:
- v2 (behavior change): the
extensionsfilter is now optional. Omitting it no longer applies the built-in Authenticode extension set — instead all in-scope files are checked. Supplyextensionsexplicitly to restrict the check to specific file types.
- Categories:
securitybinariescompliance - Supported material types:
SYSINTERNALS_SIGCHECK
Inputs
trusted-binaries-timestamp
Verifies that signed binaries in a Sysinternals sigcheck manifest carry a signature timestamp. For every in-scope file that is signed, the policy raises a violation when the sigcheckDate column (the signing timestamp) is empty or n/a. Unsigned files are ignored, since there is no signature to timestamp.
The manifest must include the Date column for the check to be meaningful: if no record carries a Date column the policy is skipped rather than reporting false positives, so run sigcheck with its default columns (the Date column is included by default).
- Categories:
securitybinariescompliance - Supported material types:
SYSINTERNALS_SIGCHECK
Inputs
trusted-binaries-vendor-keys
Verifies that third-party / redistributed binaries are not signed with the organization’s own signing key. Third-party components must be redistributed with the signature (or lack thereof) established by the party that built them; they must never be re-signed with the organization’s key. The policy flags any file underthird_party_paths that is signed and whose Publisher or Company column matches the organization identity given in publisher.
Matching is case-insensitive substring against both columns, so slightly different forms of the same organization name (for example Contoso Inc vs Contoso, Inc.) are both detected.
- Categories:
securitybinariescompliance - Supported material types:
SYSINTERNALS_SIGCHECK
Inputs
vulnerabilities
Checks that the vulnerability severity or score, found in a vulnerabilities report, are above an input threshold. It supports a CVSS “score” input for numeric threshold, or “severity” for text-based severity. Compatible with SARIF (Trivy, Grype, Stackhawk, Prisma Cloud, WizCLI and Snyk), BlackDuck and TwistCLI formats- Categories:
securityCVE - Supported material types:
BLACKDUCK_SCA_JSONGHAS_DEPENDENCY_SCANSARIFSBOM_CYCLONEDX_JSONTWISTCLI_SCAN_JSON - Auto-match: Yes
Inputs
vulnerability-scan-present
Checks that a supported SCA scan material is present in the attestation. Compatible with SARIF (Trivy, Grype, Stackhawk, TwistCLI, Snyk and WizCLI), BlackDuck, GHAS Dependency Scan and CycloneDX with vulnerabilities formats- Categories:
securityCVE - Supported material types:
ATTESTATION
webapi-validation-clean
Evaluates SARIF 2.1.0 web API validation reports and checks for results at or above a severity threshold. Default threshold iserror. Can be set to warning or note to catch lower-severity issues.
Extracts the tool name from runs[0].tool.driver.name for reporting.
- Categories:
securityAPI - Supported material types:
SARIF
Inputs
webapi-validation-present
Checks that a web API specification material is present in the attestation. Supports OpenAPI, AsyncAPI, and GraphQL specifications.- Categories:
securityAPI - Supported material types:
ATTESTATION
webserver-response-headers
Gates an OWASP ZAP (DAST) SARIF report on the presence of one or more specific ZAP rule IDs. Configure the rule ID(s) via thezap_rule_ids input
(comma-separated); the presence of any configured rule ID in the report is a violation.
This is a generic, fine-grained gate: point it at the exact ZAP rule ID(s) you care
about instead of a broad CWE bucket. One common use is gating individual webserver
response-header checks (X-Content-Type-Options, HSTS, CSP, Permissions-Policy, HttpOnly,
SameSite, fingerprinting) independently, since each maps to a distinct ZAP rule ID.
Reads rule IDs directly, so it works across ZAP 2.15 – 2.17+ regardless of the
version-dependent CWE taxonomy. ZAP’s “-N” alert-variant suffix is stripped before
matching (so “10038-1” matches a configured “10038”).
Supported Tools:
- SARIF: OWASP ZAP (2.15 – 2.17+)
- Categories:
securityDAST - Supported material types:
SARIF
Inputs
Policy Groups
branch-protection
This policy group enforces branch protection rules to ensure repository integrity. It includes policies that prevent branch deletion, force pushes, enforce linear history, and restrict who can modify protection rules. Supports both GitHub and GitLab. Read more about how to generate the needed material in the documentation.- Categories:
security
Inputs
Material Policies
code-review
This policy group enforces code review requirements to ensure code quality. It includes policies that require pull request reviews and dismissal of stale reviews. Supports both GitHub and GitLab. Read more about how to generate the needed material in the documentation.- Categories:
security
Inputs
Material Policies
cwes
This policy group applies CWE-related policies: CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses and CWE On the Cusp (ranked 26–40). Use it to enforce that source or dependency scans are free from these common weaknesses.- Categories:
securityCWE
Material Policies
pr-quality
This policy group enforces pull request quality standards to ensure proper documentation and traceability. It includes policies that require meaningful PR descriptions and links to user stories or issues. Supports both GitHub and GitLab. Read more about how to capture PR information in the documentation.- Categories:
quality
Inputs
Material Policies
pr-validation
Unified PR validation policy group covering both bot-authored and human-authored PRs. Policies self-select based on author type: bot-specific policies skip for human authors and vice versa. Supports both GitHub and GitLab. Read more about how to capture PR information in the documentation.- Categories:
qualitysecurityautomation
Inputs
Attestation Policies
Material Policies
sast
This policy group applies Static Application Security Testing (SAST) related policies.- Categories:
securitySAST
Inputs
Attestation Policies
Material Policies
sbom-quality
This policy group applies a number of SBOM-related policies- Categories:
SBOM
Inputs
Attestation Policies
Material Policies
slsa-checks
This policy group applies a number of SLSA-related policies.- Categories:
SLSA
Inputs
Attestation Policies
tag-protection
This policy group enforces tag protection rules to prevent tag manipulation attacks such as the Trivy supply chain attack. It includes policies that prevent tag deletion, force pushes on tags, and restrict who can bypass tag protection rules. Supports both GitHub and GitLab. Read more about how to generate the needed material in the documentation.- Categories:
security
Inputs
Material Policies
vulnerability-management
This policy group applies vulnerability management related policies.- Categories:
securityCVE
